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STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, ss.

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. RE-05-27

CITY OF AUGUSTA,
Plaintiff

DECISION AND ORDER

v.
STEVEN RO W E,in his capacity
as Attorney General of the
State of Maine,
Defendant
ROBERT G. FULLER, JR. and
PATRICIA E. MARVIN,
Intervenors

This matter is before the court on p lain tiffs motion for summary judgm ent In
July of 2005, the City of Augusta initiated an action against the Attorney General in his
official capacity asking the court to exercise equity jurisdiction pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A.
§ 6051 to modify or extinguish the terms of a certain charitable trust and authorize the
assets of said Trust to be converted to cash for purposes of construction of a new high
school and to remove any and all restrictions against the real estate which is the subject
of the Trust. A motion to intervene as defendants by abutters of the real property was
denied.

A motion to intervene by two heirs of the Settlor creating the Trust was

granted.1

The court granted a motion to intervene by two heirs and an interested party. Upon request by the City, the court
removed the interested party inasmuch as its decision to allow the intervention was based upon any interest o f heirs
which, according to law, could be honored in the event the court does not find authority to modify the trust and,
therefore, create a resulting or constructive trust in the heirs. See RESTATEMENT (S econd) of T rusts § 413 (1959)
(“when the purposes o f a charitable trust cannot be accomplished, the transferee holds the property in a resulting
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Asserting that there are no genuine issues of material fact and recognizing the
role of the court solely within its equitable jurisdiction/ the plaintiff has moved for
summary judgment. The defendant Attorney General does not oppose the motion but
challenges the evidentiary foundation of facts asserted by the plaintiff in its motion.
Heir and intervenor Robert G. Fuller/ Jr. has entered into a settlement agreement with
plaintiff which may or may not be consistent with this court's decision. Heir Patricia E.
Marvin opposes the motion for summary judgment and the relief prayed for by the
plaintiff.
On December 25/ 1815/ Daniel Cony of Augusta conveyed a parcel or parcels of
land "w ith a hope of providing the foundation of a liberal school for the education of
youth/ but more especially females/ . . ." t o Samuel S. Wilde, a Justice of the Supreme
Judicial Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; Samuel Cony, a representative
to the legislature of the Commonwealth; Reuel Williams,/counselor at law; Nathan
VVeston/Chief Justice of the Circuit Court of Common Pleas; and Daniel ^tone^pastor of
a church and religious society in Augusta. Said conveyance was to the Trustees and
"their successors, forever . . ." Said property was conveyed to the individuals "in trust
for the use and benefit of aiding and supporting a female academy on the site hereby
conveyed . . . ."
In 1816, the General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts established in
Augusta the Cony Female Academy for the purpose of promoting the education of
youth, and more especially females. The grantees of the first Daniel Cony deed were
named trustees "and they and their successors shall be in continue a body politic and
corporate, by the same name forever." The Trustees were designated to be Visitors,

trust for the transferor or his estate.”); Estate o f Craig v. Hansgen, 848 P.2d 313 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); Perry v.
Town o f Friendship, 237 A.2d 405 (Me. 1968).
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Trustees and Governors of the Academy, "in perpetual succession, . . . ."

By said

legislation, the Trustees were deemed to stand seized in fee simple, holding possession
"in trust for the use and support of the Female Academy."
On July 4, 1825, Daniel Cony conveyed "for the promotion of Female Education,
in Morals, Religion and Literature, for the accommodation for perpetual use of the
Cony Female Academy . . ." to the Trustees of said Academy "to hold in trust for the
use of said Academy forever.. .

The property was conveyed "to have and to hold the

same to said Trustees for the use for benefit of the Cony Female Academy fo re v er,. . .
In 1908, the Trustees of the Cony Female Academy brought before the Supreme
Judicial Court a bill in equity against the City of Augusta, et al. reciting the deed of
Daniel Cony of December 25, 1815, and the deed of Daniel Cony of July 4, 1825.

In

their petition, the Trustees assert that the corporation2 administered the Trust until the
year 1844 and stated:

"at which time, to provide for 'improved accommodation' it

purchased and suitably altered the Bethlehem Church in said Augusta, and with it
replaced the original Academy building, and thus continued the execution of the Trust
until the year 1872." After which time, in order to prevent a failure of the Trust due to
their inability to m eet the strict and literal terms of the Trust, and to prevent the defeat
of Daniel Cony's general charitable intention of "promoting the education of youth,"
the Trustees explain they leased the Academy building to a private individual to
conduct a private school for both sexes from 1872 until the spring of 1876. At that time,
the Trustees further allege, the school was closed and the administration of the Trust
was suspended until 1879, when the Academy building was sold and removed from the
lot. The Trust then commenced the construction of the school building known as Cony

2

Presumably the Academy as established by the General Court o f Massachusetts.
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Free High School. This was completed in 1880. The bill goes on to.say, "to prevent a
failure of the Trust, and in reliance upon the provisions of the public laws of 1873, ch.
115, as amended by the Public Laws of 1874, ch. 216, the said Trustees on July 1, 1881,
leased said building and the lot whereon it stands to the municipal officers of said
Augusta, and their successors in office, for the term of 99 years from that date, . . . ."
The Trustees then explained that the City of Augusta had administered a free high
school open to the youth of both sexes under the name of "Cony Free High School" up
to the date of the 1908.
The pleadings then explained, "O n June 27,1905, from the proceeds of the sale of
certain real estate previously held by it, the plaintiff purchased of one Helen W. Nichols
a certain lot of land (whereon the Reuel Williams Athletic Field, so called, is now
located) adjoining the school house l o t , . . . ."3
Finally, the bill asserts that the Trust corporation is without funds and unable to
administer the school and asks the court to find "that the City of Augusta is the
appropriate and only agency that can administer the Trust and prevent a total failure
thereof, . . . ."4 The court is asked to cancel and declare void the lease of July 1, 1881,
and the Trustees ordered to execute and deliver a quit claim deed to the City of
Augusta.
By deed of June 27, 1908, the Trustees of Cony Female Academy conveyed to the
City of Augusta the property which was the subject of, "the suit entitled Trustees of
Cony Female Academy v. City of Augusta, et al., numbered 469, on the Equity Docket
3

A subsequent conveyance o f the Trustees o f Cony Female Academy to the City o f Augusta recites as a source the
deed o f “Helen W. Nichols to the Trustees o f Cony Female Academy, dated June 27, 1 905,. . .
This appears to be
a lot o f land adjacent to what is described as Cony High School.
O f interest in light of subsequent developments, the Trustees’ pleading goes on to say, “but many of its citizens
have declared that at the meeting o f May 11, 1908, they will not vote the required relief, or consent to the erection o f
valuable property upon said High School lot, unless the City is assured o f a perpetual tenure and right o f
administration of said property and o f said school.”
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of said C o u r t. . ,

Source deeds cited were the deeds of Daniel Cony of December 25,

1815, and of July 4, 1825, and the deed of Helen W. Nichols dated June 27, 1905. The
June 27,1908 deed specifically recites that the property is conveyed:
In perpetual trust/ nevertheless/ for the purpose of maintaining under its
present name the Cony Free High School; and the premises described in
said deed of Helen W. Nichols/ to Trustees of Cony Female Academy,
recorded in said registry. Book 462, Page 491, shall be specially held by
said City of Augusta, in perpetual trust for the purpose of an athletic field,
and pleasure ground in connection with said Cony Free Fligh School,
except so far as it may be necessary to encroach upon the same by
additions to or enlargements or replacements of the present school
building.
On July 30,1908, the Trustees of Cony Female Academy conveyed a parcel to the
City of Augusta, again dting the Nichols deed and again with a document reciting the
condition that the conveyance is "in perpetual trust, nevertheless for the purpose of an
athletic field, and pleasure ground in connection with the Cony Free H igh School,
except so far as it may be necessary to encroach upon the same by additions to or
enlargements or replacements of the present school building."5
Finally, by document dated November 17, 1941, and recorded in the Kennebec
Registry of Deeds, there exists a return of municipal officers of taking by eminent
domain by the City of Augusta a parcel of land described as "the location for the
enlargement and extension of Williams Field, so-called, the athletic field or playground
of Cony High School, said parcel of land to be used exclusively as an athletic field for
girls." The document goes on to declare that the land is owned by William P. Viles and
upon the appraisal of no damages caused by the taking, "but in lieu of such damages,
this taking is conditioned upon the use of said land exclusively as an athletic field for

5

The court reads “Pleasure ground” to mean “playground.”

6
girls and that said land shall be duly fenced within five years from the date of this
taking and that said land shall be known as the Viles Athletic Field for Girls."
The City of Augusta, the plaintiff, determined that the Cony High School
building was not satisfactory to meet the requirements of high school education and
that its location was no longer satisfactory for the safety of its students. The State of
Maine Department of Education agreed to fund a substantial portion of the construction
of a new high school. In accordance with such circumstances, in June of 2004, the City
of Augusta entered into an agreement with a limited liability corporation to sell the
property upon which Cony High School and its athletic fields sit, excepting the socalled "Flatiron Building." The City intends to use the selling price of $1,5 million to
pay a portion of the construction costs of a new Cony High School and the City seeks
authority from the court to do so in light of the factual and legal history of the real
estate involved.6
In its statement of material fact, the plaintiff asserts that the use of the entire
property was consistent with Daniel Cony's intent from 1815 until 2006. Cony High
School was constructed in 1964. The so-called "Flatiron Building" is an older historic
building on the same site and is not being sold. The City asserts that the high school
has severe physical problems, including: deficient electrical and mechanical systems,
absence of a sprinkler system, defective insulation, disrepair, roof and flooring
deficiencies, shortage of space, etc.

The City has acquired a professional analysis

indicating that the costs of renovating the school would exceed the costs of building a
new school at a new site, and further, places the cost of demolition of the buildings at $1
million. The plaintiffs statement of material fact also declares that the high school,
6 The new Cony High School has been built and went into operation in August 2006. Because of this fact,
and for the sake of clarity for the contemporaneous reader, references to Cony High School in this order
specifically pertain to the old school and its property, unless otherwise noted.
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located on 6.67 acres of land/ is too small for a high school under current State
standards, that it has insufficient parking space, is below minimum code standards, and
that it has space for just one athletic field.

The City also notes that the property's

location is directly off Cony Circle, which the City asserts is "am ong the most
dangerous intersections in the State of M aine."7

The statement of material fact

continues with a number of additional deficiencies.

The statement also contains an

attached affidavit of a real estate appraiser indicating that the $1.5 million sales price is
in excess of the property's value of $1 million to $1.2 million.
Finally, the plaintiff alleges that it has reached a settlement agreement with all
parties except intervenor Marvin in which it is agreed that, if approved by the court, all
trust restrictions on the property would be removed and the City would use the
proceeds from the sale of the property for certain specific uses, to include: $600,000
towards the costs of the new Cony High School, $200,000 toward preservation of the
historic Flatiron Building, $500,000 to be held in trust as the Daniel Cony Scholarship
Fund, and $200,000 to be held in trust as the Daniel Cony Educational and Athletic
Assistance Fund.8
The intervenor's statement of material fact disputes some details of plaintiff s
statement, but the vast majority of the intervenor's objections note that the City's
statement is simply hearsay of the City Manager and without foundation.
The Law Court has explained that:

7
8

The court takes judicial notice o f the “rotary roulette” o f Cony Circle.

AH of the allegations in plaintiffs statement o f material fact, with the exception o f those provided by the real
estate appraiser, are alleged to be supported by the affidavit o f the City Manager o f the City o f Augusta. As pointed
out by the Attorney General's response to the plaintiffs statement o f material fact, many o f the factual assertions
ostensibly supported by the City Manager affidavit are not based upon sound and competent knowledge such as
would support evidence being offered in any hearing. This fact was pointed out to counsel for the City at oral *
argument and he has requested leave to file supplemental affidavits to address those deficiencies. In the interest o f
judicial economy and given certain time limitations in the City's contract for sale, the court has granted that leave
and notified other counsel o f the opportunity to file supplemental material as well.

8
Summary judgment is no longer an extreme remedy. It is simply a
procedural device for obtaining judicial resolution of those matters that
may be decided without fact-finding. Summary judgm ent is properly
granted if the facts are not in dispute or, if the defendant has moved for
summary judgment, the evidence favoring the plaintiff is insufficient to
support a verdict for the plaintiff as a matter of law.

Curtis v. Porter, 2001 ME 158, f 7, 784 A.2d 18, 21-22. Summary judgment is proper if
the citations to the record found in the parties7 Rule 56(h) statements demonstrate that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. See Dickinson v. Clark, 2001 ME 49, % 4, 767 A.2d 303, 305.
The party opposing summary judgment will be given the benefit of any reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from the presented facts. See Perkins v. Blake, 2004 ME 86,
f 7, 853 A.2d 752, 755. "A fact is material if it has the potential to affect the outcome of
the case under governing law/7 Levine v. R.B.K. Caly Corp., 2001 ME 77, f 4, n.3, 770
A.2d 653, 655, n.3 (citing Burdzel v. Sobusf 2000 ME 84, f 6, 750 A.2d 573, 575). "The
invocation of the summary judgment procedure does not perm it the court to decide an
issue of fact, but only to determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists. The Court
cannot decide an issue of fact no matter how improbable seem the opposing party7s
chances of prevailing at trial.77 Searles v. Trustees o f St. Joseph's College, 1997 ME 128, % 6,
695 A.2d 1206, 1209 (quoting Talhoood Land & Dev. Co. v. Botka, 352 A.2d 753, 755 (Me.
1976)).

To avoid a judgment as a matter of law for a defendant, a plaintiff must

establish a prima facie case for each element of her cause of action.

See Fleming v.

Gardner, 658 A.2d 1074,1076 (Me. 1995).
The plaintiff argues that the court should proceed by following the doctrine of
equitable deviation. 18-B M.R.S.A. § 412. It argues that the court should modify or
terminate the Trust because of unanticipated circumstances which Daniel Cony could
not have envisioned at the time the Trust was established. It argues that none of the
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circumstances as they now exist could have been anticipated by the Settlor at the time
the property was first put to charitable use and that the equitable deviation provided in
the statute would better advance the Settlor's purpose. The City argues that the sale of
the realty in question/ with the resulting proceeds used to provide direct and
substantial support for education in the City of Augusta/ is more appropriate under the
circumstances and does a better job of furthering the purposes of the Trust in
accordance with the Settlor's probable intention to support education than preserving a
specific building and plot of land beyond the point they have ceased to serve as an
effective means toward their ultimate end.
The Attorney General is satisfied that the facts support the proposition that the
purposes of the Cony Trust can no longer be m et where the Trust property is currently
situated but that the purposes can be met and "are being fulfilled at another location
within the City of Augusta." The Attorney General is satisfied that the sale is within the
parameters of fair market value and the disposition would be consistent with the
original educational purposes. While the Attorney General agrees with plaintiff that the
statutory provision of equitable deviation applies/ and may be the favored vehicle/ he
also argues the applicability of the cy pres doctrine as codified in 18-B M.R.S.A. § 413.
While the equitable deviation theory permits a court to find an alternative way to fulfill
the original purpose by modification of the terms of the T ru st the ay pres doctrine
allows the court to terminate or modify the Trust to carry out the original charitable
purpose,9
The intervenor argues that the plaintiff has failed to offer any admissible
evidence as to why the property cannot continue to be specifically used for athletic
9

The common law equitable deviation doctrine provides authority in a court o f equity to modify the terms o f
administration by trustees o f a charitable trust. The Maine statute allows the doctrine to be applied to both
administration and dispositive functions exercised by the trustees.
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fields and pleasure grounds.

She argues the property could be used by other

educational systems/ not necessarily secondary schools.
Intervenor also argues that because the legislative background of 18-B M.R.S.A.
§§ 412-413 is silent/ there is no standard at law for "circumstances not anticipated by the
Settlor."

Therefore/ the Intervenor argues the court should rely on common law

interpretations of the doctrines. The Intervenor notes that historically the power of the
court to modify administrative terms of the trust was very strictly limited and required
some emergency or exigency which greatly threatens the trust estate and the
beneficiary. Citing Porter v. Porter, 138 Me. 1, 20 A.2d 465 (1941)/ the intervenor argues
that the court can utilize deviation only upon "a showing of extreme hardship/ of
virtual necessity/ of serious impairment of principle/ or of inability to carry out the
purposes of the trust." Porter, 138 Me. at 7.
Finally/ Intervenor argues that the court cannot find a general charitable intent as
opposed to a specific intent because of the language relating to the specific parcels of
land in question. She alleges that the Trust covenants run with the land and that the
condition of the building is irrelevant inasmuch as it is the land that is subject to
limitation and the City has not provided any evidence that the land is unsuitable for
educational or athletic purposes. In making this argument, Ms. Marvin challenges the
affidavit of the real estate appraiser as being an opinion of value and not an appraisal
and that failure to provide such appraisal should be fatal to p lain tiffs petition.
Utilizing the argument of the status of the land, rather than the building/ the
intervenor argues that the City has failed to establish a sufficient change of
circumstances warranting deviation from Daniel Cony's specific intent. The intervenor
notes that the City intends to retain and maintain the Flatiron Building for educational/
recreational or pleasure pursuits, which in and of itself provides an admission that the
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Trust estate is secure and there exists no emergency or exigency that warrants
deviation. Intervenor cites Robert W. Traip Academy v. Staples, 317 A.2d 816, 819 (Me.
1974) for the axiom that the intention of the donor is the "Todestone[]' of the court."
(quoting Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539, 591 (1866). M s. Marvin believes that
the 1908 decree of the Supreme Judicial Court and its subsequent deed established a
specific intent since the deeds used the term "specially held by said City . . . in perpetual
trust."
An analysis of the operative language expressing Daniel Cony's intent in the
transfer of real estate to a charitable trust (corporation) and ultimately to the City of
Augusta, in its m ost plain language terms, reveals certain basic requirements in order to
satisfy the gift. First, it is unequivocally clear that Mr, Cony intended the property to be
held as a charitable trust in perpetuity and forever. With the use of that language, he
exercised the law of charitable trust that distinguishes its ownership of real estate from
individual title.

Charitable trusts are capable of having a perpetual existence.

Charitable trusts are "not subject to the ordinary rules against perpetuities and may
continue indefinitely, [even though] special problems arise with respect to their
administration." Snow v. Bowdoin College, 133 Me. 195, 199, 175 A. 268, 270 (1934). The
second clear indication of intent is displayed by Daniel Cony's transfer of parcels of
land for purposes of a school for the education of "youth, but more especially females."
Third, his language does not express the desire for the existence of a school maintained
exclusively for females, which would, therefore, allow the Trust to exist for land to
support a school for both females and males. Fourth, Mr. Cony's gift was for the land to
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be used for a "school for the education of youth/' thereby excluding college or
university education.10
The original grantees in both 1815 and 1825 were obviously persons known to
Daniel Cony and this court may reasonably infer that those individuals were well aware
of Mr. Cony's intent.

This inference can be found in the language of the successor

Trustees in their deed to the City of Augusta of 1908 wherein/ in addition to expressing
the perpetual Trust/ they recognized that the athletic field and pleasure ground
(possibly playground) in connection with Cony Free H igh School may be subject to
"additions to or enlargements or replacements of the present school building." Such an
expression would recognize an acknowledgement that the future holds a likely
possibility of additions to, enlargements of, or replacements of the then school building.
Attributing this language to Daniel Cony/ it becomes the limitations of the Trust on the
land in question. It also suggests the considerable changes in the environment between
1815 and 1908 regarding the requirements of a free high school.
This court is satisfied that Mr. Cony expressed a specific intent to create in
perpetuity a parcel of land upon which would be located a public school for females/ as
well as athletic fields and playground in support thereof.11

The undisputed facts

support the conclusion that the continuation of the land in question for purposes of a
City of Augusta high school does not meet the contemporary legal standards and the
establishment of the high school at a different location/ while appropriate/ may or may

10 The court believes the use of the term Cony "Free" High School in its early stages indicates intent to
support what is now the public school program.
Ji Contrary to argument of the intervenor/ the court does not believe that the land subject to the
charitable trust language would allow stand-alone athletic fields or playgrounds since it is clear from the
language of the deeds that the athletic fields and pleasure grounds are in support of and in conjunction
with the school.
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not require the court to declare the restrictions of the real estate in question null and
void.
The common law of the so-called doctrine of cy pres is spelled out in section 399
of the R e s t a t e m e n t

of th e

Law, Seco n d ,

of

T r u s t s (1959).

The section is entitled

Failure of Particular Purpose Where Settlor Has General Charitable Intention.

[T]he

Doctrine of Cy Pres.
If property is given in trust to be applied to a particular charitable
purpose, and it is or becomes impossible or impracticable or illegal to
carry out the particular purpose, and if the settlor manifested a more
general intention to devote tire property to the charitable purposes, the
trust will not fail but the court will direct the application of the property to
some charitable purpose which falls within the general charitable
intention of the settlor.
This doctrine has been codified in 18-B M.R.S.A. § 413.
1.
Charitable purpose becomes unlawful, impracticable, impossible to
achieve or wasteful. Except as otherwise provided . . ., if a particular
charitable purpose of a trust becomes unlawful, impracticable, impossible
to achieve or wasteful:
A.

The trust does not fail, in whole or in part;

B.
The trust property does not revert to the settlor or the settlor's
successors in interest; and
C.
The court may apply cy pres to modify or terminate the trust by
directing that the trust property be applied or distributed, in whole or in
part, in a manner consistent with the settlor's charitable purposes.
A series of Maine cases apply this common law doctrine.

In the matter

concerning the South Congregational Society of Augusta, the court notes the
requirement under cy pres of a general charitable intention. The court must be satisfied
that some other object may be found answering the intention of the donor in a
reasonable degree. Lynch v. South Congregational Parish, 109 Me. 32, 38, 82 A. 432, 435
(1912). In a case involving a perpetual trust of a farm and woodland in Augusta, the
court found a particular charitable gift but no general charitable intent and, therefore,
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the cy pres doctrine did not apply. The facts of this case were such that the language of
the settlor made it clear that the charitable purpose was linked with a particular piece of
real estate, a farm. Gilman v. Burnett 116 Me. 382, 102 A. 108 (1917).
In 1934, a Maine court reported what is generally considered to be a landmark
case in this doctrine. In this case, a testamentary gift was made to the Medical School of
Maine through Bowdoin College. This case made it clear that even though the intent of
the donor cannot be exactly carried out, that does not mean there must be a failure of
the general benevolent purpose. "The rule has been many time[s] expressed by this
court that a fund for a charity will be administered cy pres, where there is a failure of the
specific gift and a general charitable intent disclosed in the instrument creating the
trust."

Snow v. Bowdoin College, 133 Me. 195, 199, 175 A. 268, 271 (1934). The case

concludes that even if it becomes impossible to carry out the exact purpose of the donor,
the court in equity will not permit the failure of "her general charitable benefaction." Id.
at 273.
A conveyance of a parcel of land to the City of Portland for purposes of a
memorial park to honor one's mother and father was the subject of a 1976 case where
the construction of Interstate 295 required a taking by the parcel by the State of Maine
by eminent domain. The court discussed the matter in terms of the cy pres doctrine
finding a general charitable intent from the absence of an express reverter clause and
analyzed whether the precise original location of the park was essential to the settlor's
desires. Finding that the grantor did not provide a term for the gift to expire rather than
continue at another location, which would have resulted in a reverter to the donor's
estate, the court found the general charitable intent sufficient to allow the City to apply
the proceeds from the sale to another location. State o f M aine v. Rand, 366 A.2d 183 (Me.
1976).
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We next look at a will directing a trustee to create a benevolent corporation for
purposes of the establishment of a children's outing home. A t the time the bequest was
to take effect, the assets of the trust were inadequate to carry out the testator's specific
benevolent purpose.

The court explained the doctrine of cy pres as a "judicial principle

for the preservation of a charitable trust when the accomplishment of the particular
purpose of the trust is or becomes impossible, impractical or illegal." In re Estate o f
Thompson, 414 A,2d 881, 885 (Me. 1980). Under the circumstances, the court determined
that the cy pres doctrine would allow it to apply the trust funds to a charitable purpose
as nearly as possible to the particular purpose of the settlor or testator. The court makes
note of the special "favoritism which the law has toward a charitable gift or trust." Id.
at 888.
In 1939, an Illinois case contains a factual situation where a school was erected in
accordance with a charitable trust.

By virtue of a reorganization of the educational

geography of the city, the issue was whether the property could be sold and the
proceeds applied to the building fund of the board of education and to use such
proceeds for school building purposes.

The court found a general charitable trust

saying "[a] trust to establish or maintain a school or other educational institution or
otherwise to promote education is charitable although the beneficiaries are limited to
the inhabitants of a particular place, whether a country, State, city, town or parish,
provided the class is not so small that the purpose is of no benefit to the community."
Bd. o f Education o f the City o f Rockford v. City o f Rockford, 24 N.E.2d 366, 370 (111. 1939).
The court found the key question to be whether the property to be used for school
purposes is consistent with the "reasonable contemplation of the creators of the trust."
Id. at 372.
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In 1949, an Arkansas court was faced with a determination of whether the
trustees of a charitable trust could sell land owned and held for library purposes and
use the proceeds to construct a library building and then turn the building over to a
permanent tax supported library organization. In this case, a library could not be built
on the land expressly limited to that purpose. W hile this court discusses the cy pres
doctrine, it said, "W here a literal execution of a charitable devise becomes inexpedient
or impracticable, the court will execute it as nearly as it can according to the original
purpose." Bossen v. Women's Christian National Library Assn., 225 S.W.2d 336, 338 (Ark.
1949). The court then cites 10 A m . J u r , C h a r it ie s , § 51:
Thus, where the circumstances existing at the time of the creation of a
charitable trust have changed to such an extent that in order to carry out
properly the charitable intention of the donor, it is necessary to dispose of
the trust property and devote the funds to the acquisition of a more
suitable location, a court of equity will authorize the sale of the property.
Id.
In examining whether the doctrine of cy pres is appropriate to the facts of this
case, the court makes particular note of a 1972 Michigan case. In this case, the testator
by his will directed the creation of a charitable trust for educational purposes that was
limited to being fulfilled by a specific college, with the testator's books to be utilized in
a political science course, and other specific limitations. The court noted that the cy pres
doctrine had three prerequisites; the court must first determine whether the gift creates
a valid charitable trust, it must be established that it is impossible or impractical to carry
out the specific purpose of the trust, and the court must determine whether in creating
the charitable trust the testator or settlor had a general charitable intent. Most notably,
the court goes on to explain by footnote:
It should be noted that the cy pres doctrine is inapplicable when the
particular purpose of the testator (or settlor) can effectively be carried out
subject to some deviation in the method of administration of the trust.
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In re Rood Estate Hannah v. Attorney General, 200 N .W .2d 728/ 735/ n.7 (Mich. Ct. App.
1972). This case discusses the power of the court in equity to change the methods of
administration/ quoting Bogert, T r u st & T r u s t e e s (2d ed)/ §.394, pp. 236-37, "Deviation
from the administrative provisions of a charitable trust can be authorized/ even though
the trust possessed a narrow and not a general trust intent, whereas cy pres could not be
used in such a case." Id.
A n analysis o f these cases causes this court to conclude that in order to apply the
cy pres doctrine the court must find that it is the purpose of the charitable trust that
must be found to be unlawful, impracticable, impossible to achieve or wasteful.
Notwithstanding the fact that the land subject to the charitable trust that Cony High
School was created on has difficulties and caused it to be unable to continue at that
location, this court finds that Daniel Cony's charitable purpose is not unlawful,
impracticable, impossible to achieve or wasteful.
The common law of equitable deviation is articulated in R e s t a t e m e n t OF THE
L aw, S e c o n d , T r u s t s , § 381, entitled "Deviation From Terms of the Trust."
The court will direct or permit the trustee of a charitable trust to deviate
from a term of the trust if it appears to the court that compliance is
impossible or illegal, or that owing to circumstances not known to the
settlor and not anticipated by him compliance would defeat or
substantially impair the accomplishment of the purposes of the trust.
Any person with a basic education would know that the circumstances of the City of
Augusta as it existed in 1815 are substantially different than those that exist in 2007. At
the time of the original creation of the charitable trust, Maine was a province of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

Indeed, the Cony Female Academy was a legal

entity created by act of the general court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. By
1825, the State of Maine had existed for five years.

Obviously, there existed a need for
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free public education of females. It is further obvious from the allegations of the bill in
equity brought by the trustees before the Supreme Judicial Court in 1908 that during the
intervening years, there existed a lack of financial support of the Academy and there
came into existence the Cony Free High School, a function of the City of Augusta. The
use of large school buses, automobiles and trucks of substantial horse power and speed,
population growth, wear and tear of infrastructure, are all matters which might have
been conceived by Daniel Cony but it certainly cannot be said that he anticipated that
this relatively large tract of land within the City of Augusta would become too small to
achieve the purposes for w hich he created the charitable trust. There can be no dispute
that circumstances that could not possibly be known to Daniel Cony, and certainly not
anticipated by him, would cause a situation where compliance with the precise terms of
the trust, he., the limitation of use of land, would defeat or substantially impair the
accomplishment of the purposes of his Trust. As stated before, Mr. Cony desired to
create a charitable trust which would hold title to land upon which would be a school
and athletic fields for purposes of the free education of females. That purpose is not
changed by the circumstances of this case and the question before the court is whether
or not, through the use of the doctrine of equitable deviation, the terms of the Trust may
be changed by the court"s exercise of equity sufficient to achieve the alienation of the
real estate in question.
Historically, the doctrine of equitable deviation could only apply to the
administrative terms of the Trust document. However, the legislature has codified the
doctrine in 18-B M.R.S.A. § 412, Modification or termination because of unanticipated
circumstances or inability to administer trust effectively.
1.
Modification or termination.
The court may modify the
administrative or dispositive terms of a trust or terminate the trust if,
because of circumstances not anticipated by the settlor, modification or
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termination will further the purposes of the trust.
To the extent
practicable, the modification must be made in accordance with the
settlor's probable intention.
2.
3.
Distribution after termination. Upon termination of a trust under
this section, the trustee shall distribute the trust property in a manner
consistent with the purposes of the trust.
(Emphasis added).
The intervenor relies heavily upon a 1941 case applying the doctrine of deviation.
In Porter v. Porter, 138 Me. 1, 20 A.2d 465, the court held that deviation from the express
terms of the trust can be granted only upon a showing of extreme hardship, of virtual
necessity, of serious impairment of principle, or of inability to carry out the purposes of
the trust.

The situation considered must present an emergency or exigency which

menaces the trust estate and the beneficiary. The mere fact that such deviation would
result in pecuniary benefits of the beneficiaries does not constitute such necessity as
would justify a court of equity to modify the terms of the trust.
This issue in this case involved the investment of trust funds, wherein the
authority of the trustees was limited to investments of certain governmental bonds,
notes or bonds secured by first mortgages on improved real property or first mortgage
bonds of corporations "upon which no default in payment of interest shall have
occurred for a period of five years before the purchase thereof." Id. at 138 Me. 3. The
trustees sought deviation from the requirements in order to improve the income and
growth and value of the trust fund. The court did not allow the deviation because there
was a lack of extreme conditions, which was a necessary condition under the prevailing
doctrine, before which deviation would be allowed to occur.

Since that time there

seems to be a relaxation of that harsh standard depending upon the facts of the
challenge to the court's use of equitable powers.
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In 1944, the Maine court, in discussing the doctrine of cy pres, "in accordance
with the doctrine approved in Porter v. Porter," discussed deviation from the trust
instrument. The court reasoned that:
[I]f the court may, to prevent a failure of a charitable trust, apply the gift
to a different object of a similar character, it may modify the method
prescribed by the testator for carrying out the specific object. It is doubtful
if such procedure represents a true application of the rule of cy pres, for a
deviation from the express terms of the grant is often permitted to prevent
the failure of a trust which is not charitable.
Manufacturers National Bank v. Woodward, 141 Me. 28, 31, 38 A.2d 657, 658 (1944). The
court goes on to cite a number of authorities illustrating the distinction between the use
of the cy pres power of the court and the modification which equity sanctions of the
method designated by the creator of the trust for its administration.
In 1975, the Maine Law Court said:
It is well settled that a Court possessing equitable powers (as does each of
the lower courts in these cases) may in its discretion modify trust
administrative provisions.
This court has always permitted such
modifications if (1) consistent with the settlor's prim ary intent, and (2)
required by necessitous circumstances.
The court goes on to explain:
In the deviation situation trustees are permitted to administer a private or
charitable trust in some way contrary to a particular direction of the
settlor; in cy pres the court may sometimes order application of the
charitable gift to a different object of a similar character.
Canal National Bank v. Old Folks Home, 347 A.2d 428, 436, n.7 (Me. 1975) (cited with
approval in In re Estate ofBurdon-M uller, 456 A.2d 1266,1271 (Me. 1983)).
In Pennebaker v. Pennebaker Home fo r Girls, 181 S.W .2d 49, 50451 (Ky. 1944), the
court, in discussing deviation, relied upon American Law Institute's R e s t a t e m e n t
th e

L aw o n T r u s t s , § 381, Cmt. E:
If a testator devises land for the purpose of maintaining a school or other
charitable institution upon the land, and ow ing to a change of
circumstances it becomes impracticable to maintain the institution upon

of
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the land/ the court may direct or permit the trustee to sell the land and
devote the proceeds to the erection and maintenance of the institution on
other land/ even though the testator is specific words directed that the
land should not be sold and that the institution should not be maintained
in any other place.
In Arkansas in 1960/ the court expressly declined to invoke the cy pres doctrine
on the grounds that the change of location was not a change of purpose of the trust
The court noted it is "required to stand in the place of the creator of the trust and
authorize what he would have authorized had he anticipated the exigencies rendering
some change in his scheme necessary in order to prevent the loss of the subject of it."
Anderson v. Ryland, 336 S.W.2d 52/ 56 (Ark, 1960), In a concurring opinion/ one judge
states/ "If we are willing to approve a principle that permits the fundamental purpose of
the trust to be changed/ as the cy pres doctrine does, there is no sound reason for
refusing to permit a deviation in mere administrative detail." Id. at 347-348. This case is
particularly notable because the court examined what it determined to be the intent of
the settlor and ordered the use of the proceeds from the sale of the old site to the
construction of a new building on a new site to specifically meet the terms of the
charitable trust which were not modified by the court7s action. Making it clear that the
settlor intended that the trust exist in perpetuity/ and use of the proceeds were for a
specific purpose within the charitable intent the court placed severe limitations on the
use of the proceeds from the sale of the land to include; there being no change in the
substantive terms of the trust except the location o f the property/ that it was the charity
itself and not the perpetual use of the location which governed/ and that the use of the
funds on the new real estate created a requirement that said real estate could not be
subject to a mortgage or other encumbrance with the potential to interfere with the
perpetual nature of the trust.
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Arizona notes that the equitable deviation doctrine applies where there is no
diversion of the trust and no transfer of assets to a different charity or to a different
purpose. Estate o f Craig v. Hansgen, 848 P.2d 313 (Ariz. 1992).
Is Porter v. Porter the standard in the State of Maine or can it be distinguished on
the basis of the limited principle of administration of a trust/ specifically its limitation of
investment vehicles? In examining the theories of Maine cases applying both cy pres
and equitable deviation/ this court believes the case is distinguishable because even
though Daniel Cony had the specific intent to see that a school was placed upon
charitable trust land for purposes of education of females, he and his successors clearly
showed an intent to support free public education of females (and by contemporary
law, males as well).12
The most recent case discussing this issue, albeit not from Maine, is the 2005 case
of Neimann v. Vaughn Community Church from the State of Washington, 113 P.3d 463
(Wash. 2005). In this case, a church congregation sought relief from a provision in the
deed to real property requiring the church to hold the property for the perpetual use of
its church organization. The church wished to sell the property and use the proceeds to
build a new facility at a new location. The court conducts a substantial discussion of cy
pres versus equitable deviation and quoting from section 381 of R e s t a t e m e n t (S e c o n d )
OF T r u s t s (1959) it states "equitable deviation has to do w ith the powers and duties of

the trustees of charitable trusts with respect to the administration of the trust; it has to

12

Many contemporary appellate court decisions dealing with charitable trusts created in the early years
of the 20th Century apply the cy pres and equitable deviation doctrines to trust instruments which contain
race restrictions. It appears from the written court decisions that the courts simply ignore those
requirements, presumably because they are so patently unconstitutional. Knowing full well the history of
this country and the development of suffrage, the educational environment for females in the 19th and
early 20th Centuries was obviously limited, a condition which in the field of free public education, does
not exist today.
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do with the methods of accomplishing the purposes of the tru st."13 Neimann, 113 P.3d at
469. The decision says the courts apply equitable deviation to make changes in the
manner in which the charitable trust is carried out. The court notes that the trustee does
not seek to modify the primary purpose of the trust to apply the funds to an alternative
objective, nor to substitute beneficiaries, but to remove the alleged restriction on
alienation of the property in order to further the tru sts primary purpose. The court
also takes note of the comment under R e s t a t e m e n t (S e c o n d )

of

T r u s t s § 381 that

specifically supports the view that the court, in exercising its equitable powers, may
deviate the terms even if the testator in specific words directs the land not be sold and
that the institution is not to be maintained in any other place. The court notes that "the
theory is that he [the settlor] would not have forbidden it, but on the contrary would
have authorized it if he had known of or anticipated the circum stances."14 Id. at 470.
The factual findings as reported by the court are almost identical to the facts before this
court. In determining whether or not there were material circumstances not anticipated
by the settlor, the court found:
These include significant congregational growth, limitations with the
building and property, stricter development and building codes, drastic
changes in the 'community of Vaughn/ including growth, expansion, and
relocation of its business core, and finally changes in the attitudes,
expectations, and needs of parishioners compared w ith the 1950s. These
findings support the conclusion that present day conditions present
'circumstances not anticipated by the settlorfs]' in the maintenance of the
church and its service to the Vaughn community.
Id. at 471. Substitute the words "students" for "congregation," "school" for "church,"
and "City of Augusta" for "Vaughn" and we have the present circumstances.

13
14

The Maine law is not limited to administration but also may indude modification of dispositive terms.
Note State o f Maine v. Rand, supra.
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Based upon an analysis of the law of Maine and other jurisdictions in the
application of the doctrines of cy pres and equitable deviation, the court is satisfied that
first, present circumstances clearly not known to the settlor and which could not be
anticipated by him make continued compliance with the terms of the Trust and the
restrictions on the real estate such that they would defeat or substantially impair the
accomplishment of the purposes of the Trust.

Secondly, Daniel Cony intended that

there exist a parcel of real estate limited in perpetuity to the free education of the
community. Third, there is no need for the Trust to be terminated as the doctrine of
equitable deviation allows the court to modify its terms such as to continue to comply
in perpetuity with the desires of Daniel Cony. Neither the object of Mr. Cony's gift nor
his charitable purpose has failed. Accordingly, the corpus of the charitable Trust, the
three parcels of land owned by the City of Augusta upon which is placed the now
defunct Cony High School and athletic fields are no longer held in Trust, the property
may be sold at its proper value, but any and all proceeds from the sale shall be subject
to the terms of the Daniel Cony Trust and must be applied within those terms. Those
terms include; requirements that their use must be such that the Trust will exist in
perpetuity, the proceeds must be used for the ownership o f a parcel or parcels of real
estate, the activities of that real estate must be used for public education and athletics
and playground in support of that education, and that land m ust be held by the City of
Augusta in trust under the same conditions. Clearly, Mr. Cony anticipated and was
aware of the creation of the female academy but the record provides no evidence of his
placing that building within the Trust other than its becoming part of the real estate by
resting on Trust land. Accordingly, the use of the Trust proceeds may be utilized in the
construction of a building upon land subject to Trust restrictions.
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In its complaint/ the City asks this court to enter a judgm ent modifying the terms
of the Trust to allow the assets to be converted to cash for purposes of construction of a
new high school and to remove any and all restrictions against the property. For that
limited purpose/ the court will render such judgment. However, the court notes that
the City has proposed an order, apparently consistent w ith a settlement agreement
reached with intervenor Robert G. Fuller, Jr., which contains a number of provisions
which would violate the terms of Mr. Cony's charitable T ru st The use of $600,000 of
the charitable Trust funds to "defray the costs of extra items not approved by the State
for the new Cony High School" depends for its legitimacy on the nature of the use of
the funds, their relationship to free public education and their perpetual existence.
Furthermore, inasmuch as the $600,000 is subject to its perpetual existence, expenditure
of those funds for assets which will deplete the fund are not consistent with the
charitable Trust. The use of $200,000 toward the preservation of the historic Flatiron
Building is not consistent with the terms of the charitable T ru st The use of $500,000 for
college or post-secondary expenses are not consistent with the charitable intent since
Daniel Cony was interested in free public education. Furthermore, use of the principal
of the $500,000 would be a violation of the perpetual nature of the gift. The use of
$200,000 for an educational and athletic assistance purpose is approved provided it is
invested in the real estate and not subject to a mortgage or any other encumbrance or
used as collateral for any indebtedness which would be inconsistent with the terms of
the charitable Trust.
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For all the reasons stated herein/ the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is
GRANTED in principle; judgment for the City of Augusta as follows:

It is hereby ORDERED that certain real estate located in the City of
Augusta and standing in the name of the City of Augusta acquired by
deed of the Trustees of Cony Female Academy on June 27/ 1908/ and
recorded in the Kennebec County Registry of Deeds, Book 487, Page 195,
conveying the property acquired by the grantor by deed of Daniel Cony
dated December 25, 1815, and recorded in the Kennebec Registry of
Deeds, Book 25, Page 88, deed of Daniel Cony dated July 4, 1825, and
recorded in the Kennebec County Registry of Deeds, Book 54, Page 484,
and deed of Helen W. Nichols dated June 27, 1905, and recorded in the
Kennebec County Registry of Deeds, Book 462, Page 491, are freed from
the restrictions of the charitable Trust created by Daniel Cony and the
Trustees of the Cony Female Academy, which restrictions shall attach to
and become a part of the proceeds of any sale of said real estate which
shall become the corpus of the Daniel Cony Charitable Trust and which
may only be applied in accordance with the remaining terms of the Daniel
Cony Charitable Trust; the City of Augusta, as Trustee of the Daniel Cony
Charitable Trust, is directed to submit to this court a proposal for the
disposition of the proceeds of the charitable Trust in accordance with the
terms of this Decision and Order; the court will retain jurisdiction for
purposes of approval of the disposition of the corpus of the charitable
Trust and its enforcement.

Dated: March
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